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This is pretty cool. It has no bearing on Bitcoin security, but makes for fun lore.

For curves over prime and binary fields, the specifications published a “seed” parameter whose hash value is used to define the coefficient b of the curve. The provenance of these seeds has been a long-standing question, as they were provided by the NSA with no explanation or justification.

As always, the NSA provides fertile soil for conspiracies. In this case:

The best story was that Jerry Solinas, longtime NSA employee, generated the seeds using a hash of a humorous passphrase:
“I believe there was a counter rather than multiple hashing, but I don’t know details. The message was along the lines of ‘Give Bob and Jerry a raise’ or ‘Bob and Jerry rule’ or something like that. It was Bob Reiter who actually wrote the code, and he doesn’t remember the details either. Nor were we able to find archives from so long ago. If they exist, they are no doubt sitting on a hard drive near the Ark of the Covenant.”
Jerry Solinas, 2015
Unfortunately, Jerry died in 2023 and other colleagues at the time were not responsive, leaving open the question of how these seeds were originally derived.

But it seems the reality is pretty ho-hum:

In under half an hour, Claude discovered the origins of the NIST P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384 and P-521 seeds. None of them were the results of any hash algorithm at all, but rather the output of the C library’s lrand48 random-number generator, seeded with a Unix timestamp!
321 sats \ 0 replies \ @k00b 12h

Gregory Maxwell commented on Hacker News:

On September 20th a friend told me that he had as significant number of Anthropic credits that were about to expire and wondered about a use for them. I do not use their products because of their relentless commitment to depriving the public access to artificial intelligence (and particularly any AI that isn't acting on their behalf) and I strongly discourage anyone else from doing so. But since he was going to use the credits for something, I tried to think of a skut work task that would be of only idle curiosity and would not help advance their capability, enable a meaningful public announcement* for them, and was likely already probed by many others (so success would only be lottery effects). -- and basically just something so pointless I wouldn't want to waste my own compute grinding on it but might like to see the result.

So I recommended determining the origins of ECC seeds and base points. The agent worked continuously for many hours and did not uncover anything interesting that wasn't already known. I looked at the transcript and was struck by how idiotic the agent was-- significantly below the standard of intelligence I've come to expect from GLM running locally.

I'm not saying this to suggest that misanthropic hijacked someone elses work yet again-- this is an obvious question that many people have surely posed and success presumably depended on expert use (which was absolutely not applied in my friends example). But it does make me wonder if the company invisibly degraded the model performance.

[*] Seems I underestimated how trivial a result they'd bother trying to spin!
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236 sats \ 4 replies \ @Wumbo 14h

Interesting story.

I am not a math or cryptography expert but recently (in the past few months) I have lost some faith that SHA-256 will hold up.

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84 sats \ 2 replies \ @optimism 14h

How have you lost it? Like... what triggered that?

To me (and I am not a cryptographer either but I have been working in the field since the 90s) it's always been a "everything is secure until it is not" kind of thing. So you want to have options. With Bitcoin, adapting options is probably the hardest thing.

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236 sats \ 1 reply \ @Wumbo 14h

I think the speed of AI "solving" various math proofs has been the cause of the concern.

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286 sats \ 0 replies \ @optimism 13h

Right. So I think the signal here, as is basically the signal with everything that AI touches, is that we need to be more proactive, more agile, and most of all, work faster.

The constraints of adapting the bitcoin protocol are in theory lighter than the constraints of disproving the birthday problem as a limit to the maximum induced weakness on a perfect hash function, and thus any gains AI can make in the speed of breaking SHA256 can be easily matched in gains in making the bitcoin protocol more resistant to such weaknesses?

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I don't think there is anything here to make me less confident in elliptic curve crypto. I know that there are assumptions in it, and that I'm no math guy, but my grug brain says it isn't broken yet, and the odds of a potential flaw in SHA256 seem as likely as a flaw in any other cryptographic assumption available to us.

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153 sats \ 0 replies \ @optimism 14h
In under half an hour

This is one of the new Claude 5 things. It fuzzes very often. Yesterday I asked it to review a migration I'm doing on a low-level encoding library, and it created a little fuzzing harness for both versions to see what it did differently. Pretty cool.

According to Claude, this is a result of me having a little phrase in my "review this wip" template that lists leave no stone unturned as an acceptance criterium. Which I actually like that it is interpreted that way.

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95 sats \ 0 replies \ @anon 14h

Do secp256k1's generator point next please

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