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But, again, on the margin I would not be better off were I irrational in that way.
I would be better off if every other libertarian were irrational in that narrow way, regardless of whether or not I shared the irrationality.
Right, so the claim people are making is that you (and people like you) should all be more irrational. That's my take on it, anyway.
You’re giving them too much credit. They are clearly objecting to the claim that it is individually irrational, despite being completely unable to conjure a relevant argument to that effect.
I would have no disagreement with someone saying what you just said. My point would still be that it wouldn’t have mattered if I had not been included.
Obeying orders is always individually rational.
If I say to dig a trench, it makes no sense for you to claim it's all the same whether it's 100 men or 101 men doing the work. It's not actually up for debate. You have to go dig.
Except that I don’t have to, so you need a different approach.
Because rationality is subjective. Effetism appears rational when you're subjectively incompetent, but subjective incompetence is not rational.
I think I pointed to Newcomb/Calvin because a lot of the debate might not be about the individual rationality of your actions, but about the type of person you are.
Like, "the world might be a better place if libertarians were as hive-minded in their approach to voting as communists," is a defensible claim. That doesn't make it individually rational to vote, but it makes a plausible claim about the benefits of irrational conduct.
Newcombian/Calvinistic pre-determinism also touches on that. Newcomb's paradox asks whether you should do something irrational because if you were the type of person who would do that, you'd actually be better off.