To elaborate, if RDTS were to have about one block per day while Bitcoin continues to have ~140+, the relative time lock might expire on Bitcoin before they even see the closing txs on RDTS even in the mempool.

I was thinking that RDTS nodes would not see a unilateral channel closure with a normal feerate as it would only be in the Bitcoin chaintip and not in their chaintip’s blocks and thereby fail to react to it.

If a channel partner closed a channel with enough feerate to be visible in the RDTS chaintip, it would definitely also close on the Bitcoin chaintip. You raise an interesting point there, though, that the defender would then overpay for the Bitcoin network and lose a lot of bitcoin unnecessarily.

Thanks for the typo fix!

Murch

I suspect the primary risk on lightning is that a channel partner force closes on RDTS (perhaps by direct submission to RDTS miners) and its congestion/fees prevent the penalty from being mined/worth submitting to miners. I don't imagine there's a way to protect against that either.