China and its state capitalist-free enterprise hybrid economy has won the trade war in most goods and commodities.
Chinas proxy Iran has won the strait of Hormuz and oil supply war.
Russia continuies to challenge US hegemony in Europe.
AI super computer dominance remains one of the last bastions of US-western imperialist dominance.
For how long given that so many underlying structures are now dominated by China and its highly successful mixed economy model?

The Zionist owned WSJ reports its view -

'For decades, China looked to the U.S. as its economic teacher. Then came the 2008-2009 global financial crisis.

“You were my teacher,” Wang Qishan, a Chinese vice premier at the time, told then-Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson during a visit to Washington in 2008, as the American financial system was unraveling. “But now I am in my teacher’s domain, and look at your system, Hank. We aren’t sure we should be learning from you anymore.” Bob Davis and I recount the exchange in our 2020 book, “Superpower Showdown.”

It was a remarkable moment. A senior Chinese official, in the heart of American financial power, questioned whether the model was worth emulating. The question has now flipped entirely. China has since demonstrated both the ability and the willingness to weaponize its dominance in rare earths and global industrial supply chains, and a growing chorus of Western economists and policymakers are asking: Is there anything the U.S. and its allies can learn from China?

Chad Bown, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, thinks the answer is yes.

Bown, who served as the State Department’s chief economist in the Biden administration, has just published [“How to Win a Trade War”] with Financial Times columnist Soumaya Keynes. The book argues that protecting market-oriented democracies from China’s state-directed economic model will require borrowing some of China’s own tools: industrial policy, strategic stockpiling and the use of export controls as economic weapons.

“The West has no choice if it wants autonomy in some of these sectors where China has already achieved market dominance that it has now shown a willingness to weaponize,” Bown told me.

The bigger question, he said, is whether democracies can adopt China’s playbook “at a reasonable cost and with the fewest unintended consequences.” If not, he added, “it will be super messy.”

A reality check on the Chinese model is in order. —the state directing resources toward favored industries —has propelled China’s rise in electric vehicles, batteries and solar panels. But it has also produced far more than China itself can absorb, flooding global markets with cheap goods and [triggering defensive reactions] from the U.S., the European Union, India and other developing economies that were once receptive to Chinese exports.

Equally damaging at home: the relentless channeling of resources toward industrial investment has left Chinese households too weak a driver of consumption to absorb the country’s output.

China’s weaponization of minerals essential to making everything from laptops and chips to jet fighters persuaded President Trump to back down in his tariff war last year. But it has also made China an increasingly unreliable trading partner, accelerating the call for the coalitions of democracies that Bown and Keynes argue the West now needs to build.

Rather than unconditionally endorsing China’s state-led tactics, the authors offer a guide on how democracies can use those high-cost, risky tools smartly—without hollowing out the open, rules-based trading order they’re trying to defend.

Use the tools smartlyUse the tools smartly

Start with stockpiling. Bown and Keynes dip into the world of “preppers” to make a pointed observation: knowing when a genuine crisis is coming, and when to build or draw down strategic reserves, is fiendishly hard for governments. Their advice is to establish explicit, preset triggers for when reserves get released. And rather than trying to domesticate every step of a supply chain, identify the true chokepoints—the raw silicon, the wafer, the chip assembly—and secure those.

On subsidies, the authors reach for a kitchen analogy: mastering them is like baking a cake. Get the ingredients wrong, or pile on too much, and you end up with a mess. Their prescription is narrow, time-bound subsidies reserved for foundational technologies with genuine security spillovers. Advanced semiconductors are the obvious example. Broad wars over subsidies and investment incentives not only create domestic inefficiencies, but trigger “food fights” over with friendly allies caught in the crossfire.

The trickiest tool is export controls, or restricting cutting-edge technology, like advanced AI chips, from reaching an adversary. Here Bown and Keynes deploy their most memorable analogy: managing a teenager’s relationship with the neighborhood’s bad influence, a character they call “Dangerous Doug.” The risk is blowback. Cut off an adversary’s access to your technology and you may simply accelerate their drive to build domestic alternatives, reducing your leverage. The antidote is locking in allies like Japan and the Netherlands so the target can’t simply shop elsewhere.

The throughline is restraint. Winning a trade war, in the authors’ telling, isn’t about crushing your opponent. It’s about closing your vulnerabilities at the lowest possible cost to the democratic and economic values you set out to protect.

I asked Bown whether the recent U.S.-China trade truce validated or undermined their argument. One reading is that economic weapons work, as China deployed rare earths as leverage and got concessions. Another is that neither side has a real strategy, just tactical de-escalation.

“I read it as proof that these economic weapons can work in getting countries to change their behavior, at least in the short term,” Bown said. “The big question is for how long.”

Wang’s dig at the U.S. in 2008 was, at its core, a claim of independence: China no longer needed to take its cues from Washington. The West now faces its own version of that reckoning: How much can the U.S. borrow from China’s tactics without sacrificing the strengths that made it successful in the first place?'

Lingling Wei WSJ

'Today’s US Senate vote marks the first time that both houses of Congress have adopted a resolution directing a president to remove US armed forces from hostilities under the 1973 War Powers Act.

Washington, DC-based group Just Foreign Policy described the concurrent resolution to end the war in Iran as a “historic antiwar milestone”.

Gregory Meeks, the top Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said that the measure was binding, “regardless of what President Trump says”.

“I will explore all legal avenues to ensure that the Executive complies with the will of Congress,” Meeks added in a statement.'

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2026/6/23/iran-war-live-tehran-to-access-billions-in-frozen-funds

Being owned by Zionist sponsors has become a significant handicap to the US government.

The 'Greater Israel' project proposes that military aggression is justified. WW3

USA needs to accept it has lost the trade war and the subsequent military war seeking to sustain the petrodollar hegemony despite no longer dominating global trade in manufactured goods and energy resources.

USA cannot build more Interceptors without refined rare earths.

USA could do well to acknowledge Chinas mixed model employing state capitalism and free enterprise has won the trade war and results in a new global power structure where US brute military force is no longer capable of enforcing global dominance.
USA may still lead marginally in a few of the highest tech areas, but in all the areas below that high tech echelon China now leads.
The pyramid of economic and power projection now suggests China will continue to advance on the last remaining bastions of US hegemony gradually if not more swiftly usurping US imperialism and resulting in a more multilateral global economy.