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So, as I see it, you're outlining these possible paths of action?

(a) competing labs keep announcing developments and "breakthroughs" and gradually build a tide toward CRQC such that we all gradually come to the realization that "it's happening" and we must take action.

  • this is assuming they feel their incentives are to disclose things
  • as they get closer, might incentives change? might it be in their best interest to not announce developments? is "betting bitcoin" worth this risk?

(b) sneaky bad actor nation works covertly and does not announce developments and suddenly has a CRQC with which to do ill

(c) both things go on simultaneously, both public lab announcements and sneaky covert nations. This, I feel, is how it would actually go in the real world.

All told, it would be a case of what occurs first...

  • good actor lab gets CRQC first and benevolently announces it to world
  • good actor lab gets very close, then realizes a CRQC is imminent, then goes rogue
  • sneaky actor nation uses public information and private secret info and gets CRQC first then does what they do

I think that's a good breakdown, though I wouldn't necessarily call the labs "good actors" -- just actors that are more incentivized to disclose progress.

It's a legitimate question of whether the incentive to hide progress gets larger the closer you actually get to CRQC.

Regardless, though, I think for a surprise attack to actually happen we'd need a few things to converge:

  • The secret attacker(s) are significantly further ahead in progress than any disclosers
  • The secret attacker(s) would be willing to break their secrecy in order to attack bitcoin

... Right?

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